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Banking on Beijing 
WHAT THe UKrAIne CrISIS 
MeAnS FOr THe FUTUre OF 
CHInA-rUSSIA relATIOnS
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has irreversibly reshuffled the interaction between the 
world’s great powers. While Russia’s relations with the Western world have reached 
a new nadir, its ties with the People’s Republic of China have gained unprecedented 
significance. The Kremlin’s willingness to risk an open confrontation with the West 
has been premised on its conviction that much of the ensuing fallout, particularly on 
the economic front, can be buffered by intensifying cooperation with other emerging 
powers – above all with China. Through its increasingly close relationship with Moscow, 
Beijing therefore plays an indirect but nonetheless critical role in the events that are 
currently unfolding between Russia and the West.
 
CASHInG In On THe CrISIS
The crisis in Ukraine began in November 2013, when the Ukrainian government under 
then President Victor Yanukovych decided to suspend an Association Agreement with 
the European Union in favour of pursuing the country’s incorporation into the Eurasian 
Economic Union, a Moscow-dominated regional integration project.1 The months-long 
nationwide demonstrations that followed this widely unpopular decision eventually 
escalated in the wake of a violent crackdown by security forces, leading to the ouster 
of the Moscow-friendly government on 21 February 2014 and its replacement by a 
pro-Western political coalition. Within days, Russia reacted by occupying the Crimean 
Peninsula, home to a major Russian naval base. Following a controversial referendum 
on 16 March 2014, Crimea was formally annexed by Russia. In early April, pro-Russian 
protesters and heavily-armed separatist militias began to occupy administrative buildings 
throughout eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region, culminating in an all-out seizure of large 
swathes of territory. This triggered an ill-conceived military campaign by the Ukrainian 
armed forces to recapture these territories from the separatists.2
1 See David Cadier (ed.), The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration, LSE IDEAS Special Report,  
June 2014.
2  “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline”, BBC, 13 November 2014,  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
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From the onset of the revolt in eastern Ukraine there were indications of a strong 
involvement of Russian paramilitary and military forces among the separatists,3 and their 
activities were apparently stepped up over time as the conflict escalated into a full-blown 
civil war. The European Union, the US and other Western states responded by imposing 
increasingly harsh financial and economic sanctions against Russia, while attempting to 
isolate Moscow on the international stage.4 Despite a formally declared ceasefire, the 
armed stand-off in eastern Ukraine continues to this day along a frozen frontline that 
stretches from the regional industrial centres Luhansk and Donetsk to the Sea of Azov.
While China has consistently shied away from taking a clear stance on the Ukraine crisis, 
it has been able to reap a number of concrete benefits from the turmoil in Ukraine – not 
least of which is the fact that it has diverted some of Washington’s attention away from 
its geopolitical ‘pivot’ to East Asia and back to the former Cold War hotspot of Eastern 
Europe. In China’s relations with Russia, these benefits have for the most part been 
economic. The severance of ties between Russia and Western Europe has opened up 
various opportunities for China to deepen its trade, financial and investment activities on 
the Russian market.
As all of Western Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan have joined the US-led attempt 
to isolate Moscow and to impose punitive sanctions on Russia, China has resisted such 
efforts and is now left as the only major economy outside of the sanctions regime. 
(While India has similarly made no efforts to isolate Moscow, its $10 billion annual trade 
with Russia is negligible in comparison with Sino-Russian trade.) Beijing’s ambassador to 
Germany openly stated in early October 2014 that China is ready to seize any business 
opportunities in Russia resulting from the Kremlin’s diplomatic dispute with Europe over 
Ukraine.5 China’s exports to Russia climbed 10.5 percent in the first three quarters of 
2014, while imports rose 2.9 percent from the same period in 2013.
The Kremlin has looked to Chinese companies in the hope of procuring replacement 
products for banned Western oil production technologies (including Arctic and offshore 
drilling, fracking and advanced refining equipment) and electronic components for 
the military and aerospace industries, which Russia’s domestic producers are unable 
to replicate.6 China’s Honghua Group was reported to be in line to receive Russian 
contracts for oil drilling technologies, for instance, and Russia’s federal space agency 
Roscosmos has consulted the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation about 
3 Andrew Higgins et al., “Photos Link Masked Men in East Ukraine to Russia”, New York Times, 20 April 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=1.
4 “Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions”, BBC, 19 December 2014,  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26672800.
5 Ben Blanchard, “Chinese Premier to Attend Europe Summit, Sign Russia Rail Deal”, Reuters, 4 October 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/04/us-china-europe-idUSKCN0HT01V20141004.
6 Ankit Panda, “Following Sanctions, Russia Turns to China for Defense and Aerospace Equipment”, Diplomat, 
12 August 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/following-sanctions-russia-turns-to-china-for-defense-and-
aerospace-equipment/.
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the potential purchase of various electronic components for its space programme.7 In 
addition, Moscow has taken numerous steps to ease Chinese investment in various 
Russian industrial sectors, including those (such as automobile production or large 
infrastructure projects) that the Kremlin had previously closed off to Chinese investors.8 
Chinese investment in Russia more than doubled in 2014, to $8 billion. And since many 
Russian entities have found themselves effectively unable to borrow anything in US 
dollars, euros or yen, Chinese banks have become an increasingly important source of 
vital loans. During Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Russia in October 2014, 
for instance, China’s Export-Import Bank agreed to provide credit lines worth more 
than $4 billion to Russian state banks VTB and Vneshekonombank, both of which are 
subject to Western sanctions.9
Against the backdrop of the turmoil generated by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, 
Moscow and Beijing have initiated a number of substantial bilateral projects that 
Russia sees as vital in lessening its dependence on the West’s economic and financial 
infrastructure. When US sanctions led the world’s leading credit card companies 
Visa and MasterCard to suspend credit card services for Russian banks, for instance, 
Moscow officials immediately proposed the creation of an independent national 
payment system, which was to be based on – or indeed joined with – China’s payment 
network UnionPay.10 Both countries also discussed the possibility of creating an 
alternative to the SWIFT method of interbank transfers between them.11 And following 
Standard & Poor’s downgrading of Russia’s sovereign debt rating to near-junk status in 
April 2014, Moscow and Beijing signed an agreement on developing their own joint 
credit ratings agency as a counterweight to Western agencies.12
In addition, since the outbreak of tensions with the West, Russian companies have 
made renewed efforts to explore non-dollar settlements with Chinese firms. In the 
context of Russia’s deepening confrontation with the West over Ukraine, yuan-rouble 
trading has grown faster than any other pair of currencies on the Moscow Exchange.13 
7 Vasily Kashin, “Russia Must Expand Relationship with China”, Moscow Times, 5 October 2014,  
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-must-expand-relationship-with-china/508425.html.
8 Yana Tsinoeva, “Rossijsko-Kitajskie Proekty v Avtoprome”, Kommersant, 15 September 2014,  
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2567440.
9 “Sanctions-Hit Russia Signs Deals with China on Energy and Finance”, Moscow Times, 13 October 2014, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/sanctions-hit-russia-signs-deals-with-china-on-energy-
and-finance/509339.html.
10 Nathan Vanderklippe, “The Bear and the Dragon: Russia Pivots to China in the Face of Western Sanctions”, 
Globe and Mail, 25 April 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/
european-business/the-bear-and-the-dragon-russia-pivots-to-china-in-the-face-of-western-sanctions/
article18231699/?page=all.
11 “Russia, China in Talks to Make Alternative to SWIFT – Deputy PM”, Itar-TASS, 10 September 2014,  
http://itar-tass.com/en/economy/748916.
12 “Konkurrenz für USA: Russland und China Planen Neuen Rating-Riesen”, Spiegel, 3 June 2014,  
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/russland-und-china-wollen-neue-rating-agentur-
gruenden-a-973090.html 
13 Evgenia Pismennaya, “Moscow’s ‘Mr. Yuan’ Builds China Link as Putin Tilts East”, Bloomberg,  
24 September 2014,  
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In October 2014, the turnover of yuan-rouble currency trades rose to a historical high 
of $1.8 billion.14 Around the same time, the Chinese and Russian Central Banks signed 
a three-year yuan-rouble currency-swap agreement worth $25 billion.15 Russia’s largest 
bank, the state-controlled Sberbank, announced in November that it was beginning to 
issue yuan-denominated letters of credit. When the value of the rouble plummeted in 
December, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi went as far as to proclaim that Beijing was 
willing to ‘provide the necessary assistance’ to Russia in stabilising its currency, although 
he stopped short of specifying what precise measures China was willing to take.16 At a 
multilateral level, the informal ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping 
of emerging economies on 15 July 2014 formally established the  
BRICS-backed New Development Bank, a development finance institution to rival the 
Western-dominated World Bank, with an initial authorised capital of $100 billion.  
The BRICS states also agreed on the foundation of the Contingency Reserve Arrangement, 
a $100-billion special currency reserve fund to serve as an alternative to the International 
Monetary Fund.17
 
Taken as a whole, the Sino-Russian bilateral projects that were initiated in the wake of 
the Ukraine crisis promised the creation of a substantial common financial infrastructure 
between the two countries. Their progress to this day has been modest, however, and 
if the previous record of implementing Sino-Russian projects in the financial sphere is 
to be any guide, most of these plans are unlikely to be implemented. The same applies 
to other bilateral initiatives that have generated interest and concern among Western 
observers since the escalation of events in Ukraine. A Sino-Russian joint naval exercise in 
the East China Sea in May 2014, for instance, was seen by many commentators as further 
evidence of China’s and Russia’s rapprochement on account of the Ukraine crisis. But 
although ‘Joint Sea 2014’ was one of their largest joint naval exercises to date, involving 
a total of 14 ships and two submarines, it was merely the latest in a string of routine 
military manoeuvres that China and Russia have jointly organised since 2003.
In late August, China and Russia also jointly participated in ‘Peace Mission 2014’, a six-day 
multilateral military drill held under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) in the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia. SCO military exercises have taken place 
at irregular intervals since 2003, but Chinese officials stated that this year’s drill was the  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-23/moscow-s-mr-yuan-builds-china-link-as-putin-tilts-east.html.
14 “Ruble-Yuan Trading Reaches Record Levels as Russia Looks East”, Moscow Times, 6 November 2014, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ruble-yuan-trading-reaches-record-levels-as-russia-looks-
east/510723.html.
15 Alexander Gabuev, “Sanctioned Russia: A New Testing Ground for Chinese Yuan”, Eurasia Outlook, 12 August 
2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=56372.
16 “China Will Help Russia Save the Ruble If Necessary, Foreign Minister Says”, Moscow Times, 22 December 
2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/china-will-help-russia-save-the-ruble-if-necessary-
foreign-minister-says/513714.html.
17 Cf. Vikram Nehru, “The BRICS Bank: Now Comes the Hard Part”, Carnegie Asia Programme, 17 July 2014, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/17/brics-bank-now-comes-hard-part/hg8d.
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largest ever held by the Organisation.18 Remarkably, however, the scenario of the 2014 
joint exercises was centred on the simulated suppression of ‘a separatist organisation  
in a certain country, supported by an international terrorist organisation, plotting 
terrorist incidents and hatching a coup plot to divide the country’.19 Thus, beyond 
underscoring Sino-Russian solidarity, the SCO manoeuvres simultaneously served as a 
reminder that separatist currents such as those backed by Moscow in Ukraine are still 
viewed as a paramount security threat by the other states of the Central Asian region, 
including China. At the latest SCO summit meeting in Tajikistan on 12 September 2014, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin received a tepid response from the Organisation’s other 
heads of state to his renewed attempts to court international support for his policies  
in Ukraine.20 
The announcement in March 2014 of new Russian arms sales to China – in particular 
Russia’s most advanced air defence system, the S-400 – signalled a further revival of 
the long-languishing bilateral arms trade, as well as Moscow’s increasing willingness 
to supply China with state-of-the-art weapons systems. But it also merely continues a 
sequence that saw Russia emerge as China’s primary arms supplier in the 1990s. Various 
other recent bilateral initiatives, such as the announcement by Russia’s space agency 
chief of greater cooperation between the Chinese and Russian space programmes,21 
have been altogether more symbolic and insubstantial.
 
THe GAS AGreeMenT - WAS IT THAT BIG A deAl?
 
None of the aforementioned initiatives has been a real game changer, but there was 
one development in recent Sino-Russian relations that promised to have a substantial 
long-term impact on the dynamic of future bilateral interaction: the signing of a $400 
billion natural gas supply deal between Russia’s Gazprom and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) on 21 May, 2014, involving the construction of the $22 billion, 
3,200 km gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ from Russia’s Sakha Republic to north-east 
China. Alongside the landmark $400 billion contract with Gazprom, CNPC also signed  
a smaller deal with Russia’s second-largest natural gas producer Novatek to supply  
3 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) annually for 20 years from Russia’s  
Yamal Peninsula.22
18 Joshua Kucera, “Russia and the SCO Military Exercises”, Diplomat, 28 August 2014,  
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/russia-and-the-sco-military-exercises/.
19 “Military to Minimize Flight Delays During Drill”, Xinhua, 18 August 2014,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/18/c_133566325.htm.
20 Joanna Lillis, “Putin Fails to Win Ukraine Consensus at SCO Summit”, EurasiaNet, 12 September 2014, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69961.
21 Matthew Bodner, “Russian Space Agency Plans China Shift Amid Sanctions Fears”, Moscow Times, 24 
April 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-space-agency-plans-china-shift-amid-
sanctions-fears/498879.html.
22 “Novatek and China’s CNPC Sign LNG Supply Deal”, Moscow Times, 20 May 2014, http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/business/article/novatek-and-chinas-cnpc-sign-lng-supply-deal/500497.html.
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The dimensions of the Gazprom-CNPC agreement are nothing short of historic. It initially 
provides for 38 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year of gas supplies to China (almost 
a quarter of China’s current gas consumption and about 10 percent of its estimated 
demand by 2020). The gas pipeline deal had been in the making for two decades; 
the first memorandum of understanding on the construction of a natural gas pipeline 
between Russia and China dates from 1994.23 Over the past decade, China and Russia 
agreed seven times to the basic outlines of an agreement, but it consistently failed to 
materialise amidst enduring disputes over price and the role Chinese companies could 
play in building the pipeline and extracting the gas. 
Prima facie, the 21 May deal appeared as a victory for Moscow, which had long hoped to 
reduce its energy export dependency on Western Europe (currently 84 percent of Russia’s 
oil exports and 76 percent of its natural gas exports go to Europe). But by all appearances 
Moscow paid a high price for its agreement with Beijing. The conclusion of the 
agreement involved a large number of variables, including the question of who exactly 
would cover the costs of the pipeline and processing infrastructure and of upstream 
gas field development (estimated at more than $50 billion),24 the minimal ‘take-or-pay’ 
requirements for China, the conditions of a $25 billion loan China agreed to provide, the 
arrangements surrounding a suspension of the Mineral Extraction Tax in Russia, possible 
Russian concessions regarding Chinese companies’ access to upstream and midstream 
assets in eastern Siberia, and potential synergies with Russia’s LNG projects in the 
region.25 Nonetheless, it can reasonably be assumed that the decades-long deadlock was 
finally overcome due to substantial concessions on Russia’s part.
Russia had originally wanted China to pay the same price for its gas exports that it 
charges Europe, namely $380.50 per thousand cubic metres,26 but Russia’s Energy 
Minister Alexander Novak eventually confirmed an average price of $350 per thousand 
cubic metres.27 The direct expenses on gas production, processing and transit could 
eventually exceed $300 per thousand cubic metres.28 Under these circumstances, the 
contract with China will at best leave Gazprom with a negligible profit margin – quite 
aside from the fact that gas exports to China through the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline  
 
 
 
23 Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 12.
24 Akio Kawato, “Much Ado About ‘Sino-Russian Axis’”, Eurasia Outlook, 10 June 2014, http://carnegie.ru/
eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55870.
25 Cf. Ilya Zaslavskiy, “Insiders Benefit from Gazprom-CNPC Gas Deal, but Russia’s Budget Loses”, Chatham House 
Expert Comment, 2 June 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/14633.
26 Erica S. Downs, “A Grand Bargain”, Brookings Brief, 28 May 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
articles/2014/05/28-russia-china-gas-grand-bargain-downs.
27 Zaslavskiy, “Insiders Benefit from Gazprom-CNPC Gas Deal”.
28 Ibid.
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are set to commence no earlier than 2018. More than a decade will be required to 
increase the capacity of gas fields and pipelines to the promised benchmark of 38 bcm 
per year.29
It was China that emerged as the great winner of the May 2014 agreement. In spite 
of US Secretary of State John Kerry’s assertion that Washington ‘doesn’t see any 
relationship whatsoever’ between the gas agreement and the crisis in Ukraine,30 it can 
safely be assumed that the final conclusion of the gas deal was overwhelmingly owed to 
the repercussions of the Ukraine crisis. The Russian business daily Kommersant reported  
that Gazprom was put under strong pressure by the government to conclude the gas 
deal, since it was seen as necessary to confront the EU with the prospect of decreasing 
gas deliveries.31 
Similar pressures and theatrics underlie more recent initiatives to supply gas from 
western Siberia to China through the construction of a second, western gas pipeline 
route that would carry at least 30 bcm of gas per year. This project had languished 
for decades, but the increasing confrontation over Ukraine gave it a new lease of life. 
In mid-September 2014, the head of Gazprom announced that the company was 
ready to conclude a 30-year deal to export natural gas to China through the western 
pipeline route.32 The Russian and Chinese presidents signed a framework agreement 
in early November.33 But various questions and disagreements about the western 
pipeline project remain, particularly about the final price of the transported gas. The 
pipeline route would transport Russian gas across the Altai Mountains to remote parts 
of Western China, making it even less likely that Gazprom could strike a profitable deal 
with its Chinese interlocutors than in the case of the ‘Power of Siberia’ project.34
Russia’s novel isolation has also provided the impulse to open up other segments 
of the Russian energy sector that had previously been off limits to the Chinese. 
China had long sought direct access to Russian oil and gas fields in return for capital 
investments in export pipelines, but until recently Moscow was unwilling to grant 
Chinese companies equity stakes in conventional onshore deposits. In the wake of the 
Ukraine crisis, the Kremlin abandoned this cautious approach. On 1 September 2014, 
29 Mikhail Krutikhin, “East or West, Home Is Best”, Eurasia Outlook, 15 October 2014,  
http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=56936.
30 “Kerry Says Russia-China Gas Deal not Linked to Ukraine”, Straits Times, 22 May 2014, http://www.
straitstimes.com/news/world/europe/story/kerry-says-russia-china-gas-deal-not-linked-ukraine-20140522.
31 Yurij Barsukov and Alexander Gabuev, “Kak Razobrat’ Kitajskuyu Gramotu”, Kommersant, 15 September 
2014, http://kommersant.ru/doc/2567331.
32 Keith Johnson, “Hammered by the West, Putin Turns East”, Foreign Policy, 18 September 2014, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/18/hammered_by_the_west_putin_turns_east_russia_china_gas_altai.
33 Lucy Hornby, “Putin Snubs Europe with Siberian Gas Deal that Bolsters China Ties”, Financial Times, 
10 November 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79eeabb0-6888-11e4-acc0-00144feabdc0.
html?siteedition=intl
34 Johnson, “Hammered by the West, Putin Turns East”.
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the Russian government proposed to Chinese Deputy Premier Zhang Gaoli that Chinese 
companies buy an equity stake in the Vankor oil field in northern Siberia, one of Russia’s 
most important oil development projects.35 Putin personally told Zhang that the ‘state 
supported such plans’, adding that ‘overall, we take a cautious approach to letting in our 
foreign partners, but of course we set no restrictions for our Chinese friends’.36 Moscow’s 
unprecedented offer was made in the context of liquidity problems affecting the country’s 
largest oil company, Rosneft, which operates the Vankor field and is 69 percent owned 
by the Russian state. Heavily indebted Rosneft had been targeted by US and EU Ukraine-
related sanctions in July 2014, leading it to request a $42 billion loan from the Russian 
government the following month.37 By the time the Vankor stake was offered to Beijing 
in early September, a new round of EU sanctions against Rosneft was in preparation.38 
According to Eurasia Group analyst Emily Stromquist, ‘Rosneft’s decision to offer China 
a stake in the mega Vankor oil field in East Siberia signals that Moscow’s bargaining 
position has been further weakened by sanctions and that it needs the capital infusion.’39 
On 9 November, on the side-lines of the APEC summit in Beijing, Rosneft and CNPC 
signed a framework agreement envisaging the purchase of a 10 percent share in the 
field’s operator Vankorneft. 
If the chequered track record of previous energy deals between China and Russia is to 
be any guide, the practical implementation of the recent energy agreements will likely 
be beset by problems. A landmark oil pipeline agreement reached by both countries 
in April 2009, for instance, showed some signs of unravelling as early as March 2011, 
two months after the pipeline started operation, when Russia accused the Chinese of 
unilaterally cutting prices and threatened to take legal action.40 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
doubts soon arose regarding China’s $25 billion prepayment for last year’s Gazprom-
CNPC gas agreement, and Gazprom’s Deputy CEO Aleksandr Medvedev stated that 
the question of the payment was still ‘hanging in the air’.41 In March, Reuters cited 
industry and banking sources close to Gazprom who stated that Russia may postpone 
the completion of the ‘Power of Siberia’ gas pipeline project until after it has built the 
western pipeline route, a development that would directly contradict China’s preferences.
35 Isabel Gorst, “China Winning from Russia-Ukraine Crisis”, Financial Times, 1 September 2014,  
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/09/01/china-emerges-as-winner-from-russia-ukraine-crisis/.
36 Jack Farchy and Lucy Hornby, “Rosneft Proposes Chinese Company Take Stake in Russian Oilfield”, Financial 
Times, 1 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/01ab7166-31f0-11e4-a19b-00144feabdc0.html.
37 Jack Farchy and Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, “Rosneft Asks Russia for $42bn”, 14 August 2014, http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/278052ce-23ce-11e4-86fc-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3ZZOd5FW7.
38 Peter Spiegel, “EU Plans to Target Russian Oil Groups with New Sanctions”, Financial Times, 4 September 
2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/307bdcde-3442-11e4-8832-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ZcDmokeS.
39 Dmitry Zhdannikov et al., “Rosneft Struggles to Grow as Sanctions Hit Russia’s Oil Champion”, 
Reuters, 9 September 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-rosneft-
idUSKBN0H40HA20140909.
40 Linda Jakobson et al., China’s Energy and Security Relations with Russia (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2011), 31,  
http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP29.pdf.
41 Jack Farchy and Kathrin Hille, “Chinese Lenders Grow Wary of Russia”, Financial Times, 12 October 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e3ec352-51f8-11e4-b55e-00144feab7de.html.
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Gazprom has yet to comment on these latest assertions.42 The events in Ukraine have 
also served as a reminder for Beijing that Russia, unlike its pliable neighbours in Central 
Asia, remains disconcertingly unpredictable in using its energy exports as a power tool 
for geopolitical ends.
 
The fact that the recent advances in Sino-Russian energy cooperation, including the 
landmark gas agreement in May, were made at a point when the Russian government 
found itself in a position of relative weakness does not bode well for their durability 
and long-term implementation. Moscow has long felt profoundly ambiguous about 
its energy relationship with China. For many years, the Kremlin has been exceedingly 
concerned about Russia becoming a mere raw materials appendage to its booming 
neighbour, and it has made futile attempts to decrease the share of raw materials 
among Russia’s exports to China, which now account for more than 90 percent of total 
exports.43 The new gas deal is bound to further exacerbate this imbalance.
For all the benefits Beijing has been able to reap from the disturbances in Ukraine, the 
crisis has some negative economic implications for China as well, particularly in its effect 
on the substantial bilateral economic ties it established with Ukraine in recent years. 
China was Ukraine’s second largest trading partner after Russia in 2013, with an annual 
trade turnover of ca $11 billion. Prior to the crisis, China had invested ca $10 billion 
in Ukraine, and Kiev is said to have received another $8 billion investment offer from 
China during official meetings in December 2013.44 A particularly fast-growing area 
of cooperation between China and Ukraine was the agricultural sector: both countries 
signed a deal in the autumn of 2012 which stipulated that Ukraine would export 300 
million tons of grain each year to China over a period of 15 years, in exchange for more 
than $3 billion in loans.45 In September 2013, Beijing and Kiev reportedly concluded 
a 50-year contract for two Chinese state-owned companies to ‘rent’ up to 3 million 
hectares of farmland in eastern Ukraine, which is equivalent to ca five percent of the 
country’s territory.46 
Another important field of cooperation was the trade in military goods. Ukraine has 
played a vital role in China’s recent military modernisation, in particular through the sale 
of aircraft and tank engines, naval gas turbines and the world’s largest military-purpose 
amphibious hovercrafts, as well as research and development for military transportation 
aircraft. In 2012 alone, Kiev exported an estimated $690 million in arms and equipment 
42 Denis Pinchuk et al., “Russia Could Postpone Gas Pipe to China Touted by Putin – Sources”, Reuters, 18 
March 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/18/russia-gas-china-idUKL6N0WI48420150318.
43 Vyacheslav Chubarov, “Epokha Razvitogo Kolonializma”, Kommersant Den’gi, 25 January 2010,  
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1303746.
44 Emanuele Scimia, “China, Russia and the Ukrainian Divide”, Deutsche Welle, 25 March 2014,  
http://www.dw.de/china-russia-and-the-ukrainian-divide/a-17518838.
45 Colum Lynch, “Beijing and Moscow Part Ways Over Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, 5 March 2014, 
 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/05/beijing_and_moscow_part_ways_over_ukraine.
46 Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: ‘Western Civil War’ Déjà Vu?”, Comparative Connections 16:1 (May 2014), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/1401qchina_russia.pdf.
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to China.47 Given these substantial commercial links, the Chinese leadership has had an 
interest in opposing any further destabilisation of Ukraine, let alone the territorial fracturing 
of the state – not least since many of China’s investments in ante bellum Ukraine were 
concentrated in the provinces most directly affected by Russia’s intervention and the ensuing 
unrest. At the same time, China has felt a need to sustain good relations with the new  
pro-Western authorities in Kiev, in order to safeguard the substantial investments it has 
already made.48
 
 
THe SPeCTre OF SePArATISM
 
Whether or not the Ukraine crisis can provide a lasting impetus for deepening Sino-Russian 
cooperation depends on whether both countries’ shared interests will finally outweigh the 
deep-seated underlying problems that have plagued their bilateral relations for decades.  
Their strategic cooperation to date has been limited, as neither side wanted to be drawn 
into the other’s conflicts with Washington. Russia’s concern has mostly been with the 
expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe, a subject of relative disinterest to China.  
The greatest irritant for Beijing, meanwhile, has been Washington’s strategic pivot to the 
Asia-Pacific region, which in turn has been of little importance for Moscow. The Kremlin has 
not taken a stance on the East and South China Sea disputes, let alone publicly supported 
China’s position. It enjoys good political and economic relations with Beijing’s long-time 
rivals Vietnam and India. And all its partnership rhetoric notwithstanding, Russia ultimately 
has deep qualms about the growth of China’s power. Having long been eclipsed by their 
former junior partner, both in economic and in (conventional) military terms, the Russians 
have never fully set aside their suspicions that China might one day covet Russia’s sparsely 
populated but resource-rich Far Eastern borderlands.49 
One of the few factors and interests that have provided a dependable bond between 
China and Russia has been the increasing convergence of their regime types, as the Russian 
government has gradually embraced an authoritarian model of single-party governance not 
unlike (and partially inspired by) the Chinese one. One of China’s and Russia’s most potent 
motives for closely coordinating their positions on international affairs has been the two 
governments’ increasingly similar outlook on international events and the threats they could 
pose for domestic single-party rule. This is the context in which Beijing and Moscow have 
constantly affirmed the twin principles of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for 
state sovereignty, a process that began in the late 1990s with the dispute over Western  
 
 
47 Scimia, “China, Russia and the Ukrainian Divide”.
48 Gregory Moore, “China’s Stake in the Ukraine Crisis”, Diplomat, 21 May 2014,  
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-stake-in-the-ukraine-crisis/.
49 Luke Harding, “Russia Fears Embrace of Giant Eastern Neighbour”, Guardian, 1 August 2009, 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/02/china-russia-relationship.
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intervention in the Kosovo conflict. It continued in the debates about intervention 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iran, Libya and Syria, as well as increasing Western 
condemnations of human rights violations and the curtailing of civil liberties in 
authoritarian states. 
When the narrative of non-interference and the preservation of sovereignty first arose 
as a link between China and Russia in the 1990s, their overriding shared concern was 
a fear of separatism. In Moscow’s case this was centred on Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus, as well as other Muslim-majority territories of the Russian Federation; in 
Beijing, it was focused on the restive western provinces Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as 
China’s continued claims to the ‘breakaway province’ Taiwan. In recent years, however, 
Beijing’s and Moscow’s primary reason for opposing any form of foreign intervention 
and infringement on national sovereignty has not been separatism, but rather their 
concern that foreign interference might undermine the foundations of single-party rule. 
This has always been a concern for the Communist Party in China, and it increasingly 
became one for Vladimir Putin as well, as he oversaw Russia’s gradual transition from a 
flawed but reasonably pluralist democracy into an autocracy centred on his person. 
Beginning in 2003, a series of ‘colour revolutions’ and uprisings against autocratic 
regimes showcased the growth of popular demands for democratisation. These 
developments have been observed with equally great apprehension in Beijing and in 
Moscow. Both China and Russia have sustained the narrative of non-interference and 
the preservation of sovereignty with great consistency, although it was heavily dented 
by Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008 and its support for the secession of two 
Georgian provinces, in blatant violation of the principle of state sovereignty. At the  
time, Russia’s attempts to solicit support from China for its actions in Georgia proved 
fruitless. China, along with the fellow member states of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, stood firm in upholding the principle of state sovereignty and refused to 
endorse Russia’s military action, much less recognise the independence of the newly 
declared countries.50 
In the case of Ukraine, Moscow’s actions have been more drastic than in Georgia, 
culminating in the outright annexation of a territory the size of Belgium and the 
ongoing attempt to carve an equally large chunk of territory out of the east of the 
country. The Kremlin was unable to accept the popular ouster of a government that was 
not only pro-Russian in orientation, but had increasingly grown to resemble Putin’s own 
regime in style and in substance. It is likely that Russia’s intervention was in large part  
 
 
 
50 David Stern, “Security Group Refuses to Back Russia’s Actions”, New York Times, 28 August 2008,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/world/europe/29russia.html?pagewanted=alland_r=0. This is not to say 
that China itself hasn’t, on occasion, shown a cavalier attitude towards the question of state sovereignty, as 
showcased in its longstanding support for separatist factions in neighbouring Burma.
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designed to destabilise the new pro-Western government in Kiev or, at the very least, to 
signal that a prohibitively high price is to be paid for any decisive move away from the 
Russian fold.51
 
BeIjInG’S reSPOnSe TO THe CrISIS In UKrAIne
 
From the onset, Beijing’s official reaction to the events unfolding in Ukraine has been 
tortuously non-committal and equivocal. A strategic advisor to the Chinese government 
explained in March 2014 that ‘we are going to lie low on this issue, wait and see how 
it plays out, and at the end we will be friends with everybody.’52 Following Russia’s 
occupation of Crimea in late February 2014, Chinese officials made visible efforts not 
to make their criticism of Moscow too explicit. But in spite of numerous assertions 
by Russian government officials at the time that its actions enjoyed China’s support, 
what little commentary there was from Chinese diplomats was guardedly critical of the 
violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.53 China’s foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated 
on 2 March that ‘it is China’s longstanding position not to interfere in others’ internal 
affairs. We respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine’.54 
When queried at the regular press conference the following day if Beijing had offered 
diplomatic support to Moscow after the Russian Parliament voted to approve the use of 
force against Ukraine, Qin merely referred back to his previous statement.55
China’s Foreign Ministry repeated its perfunctory affirmation of ‘respect’ for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine at several other press conferences.56 
Throughout March, Liu Jieyi, China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
also made such statements in several of the Ukraine-related debates of the UN Security 
Council.57 In the months that followed, however, references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and  
 
51 Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker, “Putin’s Frozen Conflicts”, Foreign Policy, 13 February 2015, 
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52 Jamil Anderlini, “Ukraine Standoff Puts China on the Spot”, Financial Times, 12 March 2014, 
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54   “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the Current Situation in Ukraine”, Chinese Foreign 
Ministry, 2 March 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/
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Ministry, 4 March 2014,  
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Foreign Ministry, 17 March 2014, 
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territorial integrity became much rarer in Beijing’s official comments on the situation 
in Ukraine. Instead, the official narrative shifted to give more prominence to Beijing’s 
demand that all sides demonstrate ‘full consideration of the legitimate rights, interests 
and aspirations of all regions and ethnic groups’.58 This phrase, which appears in 
almost all subsequent official statements on the Ukraine crisis, can be read as implicit 
backing for the Russian position. Nonetheless, Chinese officials have so far refrained 
from recognising Crimea as a part of Russia, even when queried directly on the issue. 
What is more, already a few days after the overthrow of the Yanukovych government 
in Kiev, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying implicitly expressed 
Beijing’s support for the new government (in spite of Moscow’s insistence that it was 
an illegitimate regime of ‘fascist’ usurpers), stating that ‘China does not interfere in 
Ukraine’s internal affairs [and] respects the independent choice made by the Ukrainian 
people in keeping with Ukraine’s national conditions’.59 China’s government also 
recognised the election of Petro Poroshenko as President of Ukraine on 25 May 
(although it sent its official message of congratulations with a conspicuous delay).60
As during the Georgian crisis in 2008, China also failed to lend Russia its outright 
support in the United Nations, where Beijing and Moscow usually act in unison. On 
15 March Beijing chose not to vote against a US-sponsored draft resolution on the 
Security Council to declare the secession referendum in Crimea illegal, opting instead 
to abstain. Likewise, on 27 March, when the UN General Assembly voted on a non-
binding resolution to declare the secession referendum in Crimea invalid and refuse to 
recognise its annexation by Russia, China once again abstained.
Notwithstanding the reticence of Beijing’s foreign policy officials, however, the major 
state-controlled Chinese media have for the most part been outspokenly supportive 
of Russia’s claims in Ukraine. During the early stages of the Russian intervention in 
Crimea, various articles published by China’s state news agency Xinhua attacked the 
West for supposedly having created the crisis in the first place by ‘installing a so-called 
democratic and pro-Western Ukrainian government’. By contrast, ‘when it comes to 
cleaning a mess the West created in the country’s backyard, Russian leaders once again 
proved their credibility and shrewdness in planning and executing effective counter-
moves.’61 People’s Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, ran 
several articles that expressed similarly damning criticism of the West’s conduct in the 
Ukraine crisis while affirming that ‘it is quite understandable when Putin said  
 
58 See e.g. “United Nations Security Council 7157th Meeting”, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 16 April 2014,  
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59 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on February 24 2014”, Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, 24 February 2014, 
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Foreign Ministry, 4 June 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1162789.shtml.
61 Ming Jinwei, “Commentary: The West’s Fiasco in Ukraine”, Xinhua, 7 March 2014, 
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his country retained the right to protect its interests and Russian-speakers living in 
Ukraine’.62 China’s leading television news channels, such as China Central Television, 
featured prominent commentators proclaiming that the West’s ‘illegal actions’ in Ukraine 
had made the situation more volatile.63
Some of the most explicit endorsements of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine were 
published by Global Times, a Communist Party-owned tabloid, which argued that 
‘backing Russia is in China’s interests’, since Moscow ‘has been resisting the eastward 
trend of Western forces in Ukraine’. Various Global Times op-eds urged that China not 
‘disappoint Russia when it finds itself in a time of need’64 and claimed that the blame 
for the turmoil in Ukraine lay squarely with the West, describing it as merely the latest 
episode in the West’s history of foreign interference in the name of ‘humanitarian 
intervention, regime change, and nation building.’65 In one op-ed piece in Global Times, 
Yang Yucai, a professor at the PLA National Defence University, claimed that ‘the Putin 
administration’s high efficiency in managing the regional crisis is impressive’ and ‘sets [an] 
example of strong crisis management with [a] firm legal basis.’66 Yang’s colleague at the 
National Defence University, Senior Colonel Fang Bing, espoused very similar views in a 
lengthy interview in the July 2014 issue of Ordnance Science and Technology. Fang voiced 
no particular concern about setting a precedent for the breakup of a modern state. 
Instead, he expressed admiration for Putin’s decisiveness and resolve. Fang also showed 
a pronounced interest in the detailed tactical and operational methods employed by the 
Russian forces in their takeover of Crimea, indicating that the Chinese military has studied 
these – as well as Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics in eastern Ukraine – with  
great interest.67
Overall, to the extent that the major state-controlled Chinese media – including those that 
are generally regarded as the most reliable barometers of the prevalent opinion in central 
government circles – took any position on the crisis in Ukraine, they overwhelmingly 
sided with Russia and urged the government to adopt a sympathetic stance. Not least on 
account of the sympathetic media coverage, Pew Research Centre established in  
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mid-2014 that China was one of the few countries worldwide where popular support 
for Russia had increased since the onset of Moscow’s confrontation with the West over 
Ukraine – rising to 66 percent in July, as opposed to 49 percent a year before.68 
Official Chinese government spokespeople have largely fallen silent on Ukraine. What 
little commentary there has been from the official Chinese foreign policy establishment 
has slowly tilted further in support of the Kremlin’s position. In particular, Beijing 
repeatedly offered support to Russia in its opposition to the widening range of Western-
imposed sanctions. Deputy Premier Zhang Gaoli reassured Putin in early September ‘that 
the Chinese side is categorically against US and Western sanctions against Russia, against 
colour revolutions, and against attempts to restrain Russia’s development’.69
 
 
CHInA’S COnFlICTInG COnCernS
The ambivalence in China’s official reaction to the Ukraine crisis reflects its concerns 
about the most problematic aspect of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine – the blatant 
infringement of the country’s sovereignty and the annexation of a part of its territory. 
If applied to China itself – where the central government is facing secessionist 
movements in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as separatist currents in Hong Kong, whilst 
insisting that Taiwan remains part of China’s sovereign territory – such a course of action 
would be considered intolerable. Unsurprisingly, according to China Digital Times, China’s 
Central Propaganda Department explicitly instructed Chinese media reporting on the 
events in Crimea not to ‘connect the story to our own country’s issues with Taiwan, 
Tibet, or Xinjiang.’70
 
What has caused Beijing particular distress is the explicitly humanitarian rationale 
Moscow provided for its intervention in Ukraine. In spite of the fact that the lives of 
Russian-speakers were at no point under any credible threat prior to Russia’s intervention 
in Crimea, Moscow cloaked its invasion of the peninsula in the language of classic 
concepts of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect71 – the very 
concepts that China and Russia had steadfastly opposed whenever they were employed 
by Western governments. Following the successful annexation of Crimea, Moscow 
used these arguments for its ongoing, undeclared intervention in eastern Ukraine, 
condemning the suffering of the civilian population which – although very real in this 
case – has been the result of a war that is largely of Russia’s own making. What is more,  
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the chosen legalistic method of annexation – the conduct of public referenda on the 
future status of Crimea and eastern Ukraine – is unacceptable to China.72 If the vogue 
of holding such plebiscites were to spread to China’s own restive autonomous regions, 
their outcome would probably not be to Beijing’s liking. In Taiwan, the polling record 
also clearly suggests that a referendum on the island’s future would find a comfortable 
majority of the population rejecting unification with mainland China.73
Given these circumstances, why has China’s official reaction to Russia’s violation of its 
Budapest Memorandum pledge to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity been limited to 
a few tight-lipped protestations by junior diplomats? As pointed out before, China, like 
Russia, sees great potential danger in any public protests that culminate in the ouster of 
governments. From Beijing’s perspective, Ukraine was merely the latest iteration of the 
recent wave of ‘colour revolutions’, and it is one that Beijing, as much as Moscow, fears 
might lead to repercussions of even emulation at home. Hence, Beijing’s irritation about 
Russia’s blatant violations of the sovereignty principle has been offset by its even more 
profound opposition to the West’s earlier solidarity with the Maidan movement and the 
regime change in Kiev. 
The twin norms of sovereignty and non-interference have long proven highly convenient 
for the Chinese and Russian leaderships in pursuing their overriding policy imperative – 
to avert any threats to their domestic monopoly of power and any challenges to their 
mode of governance – for as long as they were employed as a means of preventing and 
delegitimising Western assistance to pro-democratic revolts and regime change. What 
distinguishes the Ukrainian case from recent instances of foreign intervention by Western 
states is the fact that Russia’s military incursion and blatant breach of the sovereignty 
principle were orchestrated in opposition to a pro-Western popular uprising. China’s 
government could not credibly endorse the former, but it also had every reason to loathe 
the latter – and to be quite content for Russia to have ‘sent a message’ to the West about 
preventing similar events in the future. The mass protests in Hong Kong in the autumn 
of 2014 were a manifestation of precisely the kind of scenario that has driven Beijing’s 
response to the events in Ukraine.
 
Yet another factor that has contributed to China’s reluctance to condemn Russia’s 
intervention in Ukraine is Beijing’s own renewed appetite for advancing territorial claims 
vis-à-vis its neighbours. To some extent this reflects China’s growing international weight 
and its shifting approach to the global order during a period of ongoing domestic 
transition. As China’s power and international influence have surged, many factions in the 
Chinese leadership have been increasingly willing to challenge the global status quo  
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that has benefitted the country for so long, demanding that the central government 
use its unprecedented power to assertively advance Chinese interests and to press 
territorial claims. Since 2009, China has begun to ‘create facts on the ground’ in 
disputed maritime territories – as manifested, for instance, by Beijing’s declaration of 
an ‘air defence identification zone’ covering the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 
the East China Sea, or the continued deployment of paramilitary maritime surveillance 
vessels and fishing fleets in the South China Sea, amidst a considerable naval build-up. 
Not least for this reason, the predominant sensation in Beijing regarding Moscow’s 
intervention in Ukraine has been different from what it was during Russia’s conflict with 
Georgia in 2008. Putin’s belligerent response to what many in the Russian government 
perceived as a constant Western encroachment on its spheres of influence has been 
well received by many in Beijing. Among the more hawkish factions within China’s 
governing elite, it has been appreciated as sending an implicit signal to Washington 
that a similarly hostile reaction might loom in East Asia if the US were to continue to 
encroach on China’s own perceived spheres of influence. 
One line of argument emanating from Moscow to justify its land grab in Ukraine 
has been Russia’s purported historical, ethnic and cultural claims to Crimea and, 
less explicitly, to ‘Novorossiya’ (south-eastern Ukraine). Chinese policymakers are 
more than aware that invoking such historical claims and the irredentist motivation 
of redrawing borders along perceived ethnic lines could pose a severe threat to the 
stability of China’s volatile Western borderlands. At the same time, however, there has 
been some sympathy in China for Russia’s affirmation of ethno-historical arguments. 
Russia’s rationale for intervening in Crimea and ‘Novorossiya’ has resonated with a 
growing chorus of Chinese nationalists, who view the Russian tactics in taking over 
Crimea – acting quickly and decisively, presenting the world with a fait accompli – as 
an insightful template for a possible reintegration of Taiwan, or the numerous disputed 
islets in the East and South China Seas.74 Vladimir Putin has long been idolised by 
Chinese nationalists who contrast his assertiveness with what they perceive as their 
own government’s reluctance to assume a more aggressive international stance 
commensurate with China’s growing power.75 
For the Chinese leadership, the Russian experience of how conducting a ‘patriotic’ 
military campaign at a time of impending economic stagnation (paired with a tightly 
controlled press) can lead to unprecedentedly high public approval ratings for the 
government has undoubtedly been instructive. Unsurprisingly, Japan’s Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe warned at the G7 meeting in the Netherlands in late March 2014 that 
‘what is happening in Crimea is not merely an issue for this region, but it could happen 
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in Asia’, and Daniel Russel, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, told the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that countries in Southeast Asia were worried that 
the Crimea model could serve as a precedent for China to obtain territories in the South 
China Sea by force and coercion. Russel said the retaliatory sanctions imposed on Russia 
by the US, the EU, and others should have a ‘chilling effect on anyone in China who 
might contemplate the Crimea annexation as a model.’76 
Should Beijing indeed decide to mimic the tactics introduced by Russia in its own 
neighbourhood, however, this would likely lead to a head-on collision of Chinese and 
Russian interests. An explicit Chinese assertion of historical claims to neighbouring 
territories similar to those Putin invoked in respect of Ukraine would inevitably  
rekindle the not-so-dormant fears of Chinese expansionism in Russia’s own Far Eastern 
borderlands, poisoning bilateral relations in the process. The most likely theatre for such 
a collision of interests to manifest itself is Central Asia, where Sino-Russian tensions have 
long been simmering under the surface.
 
COnClUSIOn
 
The crisis in Ukraine has propelled the bilateral ties between China and Russia to 
new heights. Through its belligerence in Ukraine, Moscow has manoeuvred itself 
into an impasse in its relations with the West that compels it to rely on Beijing to an 
unprecedented extent. But although Sino-Russian relations have improved significantly 
throughout the past two decades, Russia’s sudden move to seek much closer integration 
with China derives from short-termist, tactical considerations, rather than a coherent, 
long-term strategy. Russia’s novel isolation and its growing detachment from the West 
will likely render it continuously more dependent on China – without Beijing actually 
having to take a firm stance on the events in Ukraine. As a result of this, however, the 
bilateral relationship, which was volatile at the best of times, is becoming even more 
lopsided than before. Since the latest invigoration of Sino-Russian cooperation is born out 
of Russia’s weakness and further exacerbates the existing imbalance between both states 
(which has long been an enormous concern for the Kremlin), bilateral relations are prone 
to remain unstable.
76 David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Warns China Not to Try Crimea-Style Action in Asia”, Reuters, 4 April 2014, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/us-usa-china-crimea-asia-idUSBREA322DA20140404.
STRATEGIC UPDATES
This paper analyses the consequences of the US pivot to Asia on the 
US-Japan alliance and on Japanese foreign and security policies. On the 
one hand, the US pivot is reassuring for Tokyo, since it seeks to ‘rebalance’ 
Chinese military ascendency and to strengthen extended deterrence in 
the region. On the  other hand, it contributes to the acceleration of the 
‘normalisation’ of Japanese security policies, speeding the process of 
overcoming the institutional self-binding prescriptions that underpinned 
Japan’s post-war pacifism. 
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Back during the Cold War, when the politics of the Kremlin were opaque, 
journalists and analysts often became obsessed with the personality of the 
leader of Russia, speculating about his taste in whiskey or suits, tracking his 
wife’s fashion sense or lack of it, hoping that would give them some clue 
about his policies. Times have changed, but the personality and beliefs of 
Vladimir Putin, the current Russian president, still matter just as much as 
those of his predecessors - if not more. In a state where authority is still 
vested in personalities, not in institutions, the Russian president’s vision of 
his country, his understanding of its history, his training as a KGB officer and 
his personal experience of life in the Soviet Union now have an incalculable 
impact on Russian political life
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Cyberspace is a domain of warfare unlike all others: it is informational  in 
nature, accessible without the need for spatial proximity, and acts as a 
global data and communication highway. These properties have given rise 
to patterns of continuous, low-intensity clandestine cyber conflict. The 
existing Laws of War, which apply to cyberspace as a matter of doctrine, 
are ill-equipped to deal with this. The community of states must negotiate 
a treaty on cyberwar, institutionalise cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation of cybercriminals, and place state-sponsored digital espionage 
within the World Trade Organisation’s remit to arbitrate anti-competition 
disputes. 
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the crisis in Ukraine has propelled China-russia 
relations to new heights.  against the backdrop of 
the events in eastern europe, Beijing and Moscow 
have been able to initiate a number of bilateral 
economic, financial and energy projects that have 
promised an unprecedented degree of integration 
between the two countries. Most of these plans 
are unlikely to be fully implemented, but russia’s 
novel isolation has provided the impulse to open up 
various sectors of the russian economy that were 
previously off limits to the Chinese. Moscow’s move 
to seek much closer integration with Beijing derives 
from tactical considerations, rather than a coherent 
long-term strategy, and russia’s growing isolation 
from the West will likely render it continuously more 
dependent on China. Beijing’s official reaction to the 
turmoil in Ukraine has been reticent and equivocal, 
but the major state-controlled Chinese media have 
been outspokenly supportive of russia’s claims.  
the apparent ambivalence in China’s reaction to the 
Ukraine crisis reflects its concerns about the most 
problematic aspect of Moscow’s actions there – the 
blatant infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
the annexation of a part of its territory. But Beijing’s 
irritation about russia’s blatant violations of the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference was 
largely offset by its even more profound opposition 
to the pro-Western regime change in kiev. russia’s 
actions in Ukraine have also resonated with 
nationalist factions in Beijing who have long argued 
for a greater assertiveness in advancing China’s own 
territorial claims vis-à-vis its neighbours.
